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[Summary] Corruption has become a fashionable subject the last decade or so. The 
decades before it was neglected, and the phenomenon itself has been  around as long as 
large-scale organisations. One reason for large shifts in emphasis is the lack of precise 
knowledge about corruption, particularly at elite level. That admits different views. When 
both social scientists’ and politicians’ perceptions are interrelated large shifts may be 
expected. By comparing the major corruption indexes such as Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Indexes to an earlier attempt to expand precise knowledge for policy-
making, I argue that they are unable to supply the knowledge needed. The difﬁculty in 
gaining information about elite corruption is illustrated by means of simple game theory.   
Jens Christopher Andvig
‘A house of  straw, sticks or bricks’?
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1. Introduction 
  A serious problem for anyone who believes that corruption is a major international 
policy issue today, is that it was not so two decades ago. Despite some evidence to the 
contrary (Kaufmann et al, 2005), corruption is likely to be a  perennial issue, and not  
likely  to change much in  seriousness during a decade or two. And if it has, we have 
no valid instrument to tell whether that impression is fact or fiction. The instruments 
so far developed for measuring integrity today certainly cannot cope with history. 
Moreover, given the fragmented kind of data then available even a fairly dramatic 
increase in corruption incidence may not explain any increased concern. Policymakers 
and researchers would not know and hardly been able to guess.  So how to explain the 
increased concern? 
 
Maybe a detailed historical explanation linking it to the end of the Cold War, the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the US’s  strengthened international position, and 
so on, would do, but here I will focus on the informational structure  of  public ‘data’ 
on corruption that  creates a propagation mechanism that  allows the wide swings in 
the perception of corruption as a policy. The same mechanism creates also one of  the 
most serious problems for the validity of  several of the leading research tools, the 
corruption perception indexes. 
  
 2. Corruption concern as an information cascade 
      
Note that corruption is not the only international issue that has come into the forefront 
of  policy attention that is built on information-poor foundations: International  
terrorism and organized crime are phenomena that have received even more attention. 
Here too the lack of precise information about vital properties of their workings may 
have contributed to the wide swings in the assessments of the dimensions and nature 
of these issues.1  
 
The key idea in the following is very simple and inspired by the established economic 
theory of information cascades, originally developed by researchers interested in the 
workings of financial markets (Bikhchandani et al, 1992) and later developed for the 
political economy field by Kuran (1995).  Put simply, since corrupt transactions 
(except small-scale transactions in high-frequent corruption surroundings) are kept 
secret, few receive or emit reliable signals based on their own experience. They are 
most likely to rely on general opinion expressed by others.  
 
 If a few agents who are placed in positions where they are likely to possess the 
relevant private knowledge (like Wolfensohn in the World Bank), shift from claiming 
corruption as a non-issue, to an issue of serious concern, other may accept the 
judgment, and emit signals confirming that judgment to other agents and thereby start 
a cascade.  Hence, both the persistent lack of concern until the 1990s as well as the 
subsequent rise may up to a point be explained  by a kind of informational cascade-
like mechanism. Transparency International’s perception index itself contributed to 
this cascade. Since few OECD citizens have reliable private information, and when 
they have,  would rarely emit it,  the index itself  had strong impact  by  making 
corruption something  available to public inspection. By constructing numbers the 
index has made corruption real and in the political domain, and also creating the 
impression of something  possible to control by public policy. Without public 
numbers corruption may remain private.2  
 
                                                 
1 As we will see, agents involved with corrupt transactions - like members of organized crime units - 
try to keep everything secret, while terrorist organizations, of course, prefer selective publicity.  The 
reason why terrorism in particular has received so huge amount of attention  is probably due to the way 
lack of information had combined with the availability heuristics based on risk perception 
characteristics of  the phenomenon to create what Kuran and Sunstein (1999)  have called an 
availability cascade and an exceptionally strong one.  
2 Once upon a time business barometers where suspected to have strong impact on the business cycle, 
but even so, those were composed by variables that  would not change  value by the very fact that a 
business barometer value  is announced. Moreover, it was not unreasonable to assume that the effects 
of a forecast was so systematic on the underlying functions simulating the business cycle that one could 
revise a forecast, knowing its effects so in principle be able to make a correct forecast (Morgenstern, 
1928).  It is difficult to envision how that could be achieved   with a corruption perception index. 
However, the same mechanism that has contributed to the impact of particularly  the  
TI perception index  on the corruption policy cascade - the strong interaction between  
agents’ perceptions - at the same time raises serious doubts about  perception indexes 
as  research tools, and  as an  instrument for picking up the effects of  anti-corruption 
policies.  That is the issue we now turn to. 
 
During the discussion I will more or less implicitly compare the effort in making 
corruption (and other governance indicators) an observable and quantifiable 
phenomenon with another great effort in making complex societies amenable to 
policy control through quantification, national accounting. While this point for 
comparison may sometimes make me sound critical it also implies that I consider the 
efforts to be potentially among the most important recent developments in social 
science that may open up vast new fields of  social and economic issues  to empirical 
inquiry.3 The focus is on the information characteristics. The even more important 
difference in terms of power will not be dealt with here: While it may make sense to 
convince the economic and political elites to support rational macroeconomic 
policies, they are likely to be the ones who gain by high-level corruption, their 
behavior and power is likely to be the main problem in any serious anti-corruption 
policy. 
 
3. National income statistics and corruption perception index compared  
It may sound trivial, but empirical research about corruption can not build on 
systematic observation of a large number of proven corrupt acts in the same way as 
empirical research of, let us say, private consumption and the other items of national 
income statistics: 
(1) The incentives to lie about the basic process are so much stronger. 
This is maybe the most important point. Ideally, the data applied in 
                                                 
3 Quite similar developments have taken place in conflict and democracy studies where the need for 
quantitative indicators have arisen in explaining the causes and consequences of  democracies and 
conflicts by econometric methods. Democracy indexes are the oldest, but share some of the Irish Stew 
character of the corruption indexes while the conflict indexes are based on more homogeneous 
observatory materials.  Kaufmann et al (2005) collect and process several other governance indicators.  
I will not try to make a full comparison of the these governance indicators. In various degree they share 
the weaknesses and the potential usefulness of the corruption indicators, but are related to an exciting 
expansion of  economics research into new fields of theoretical inquiry that has developed a need for an 
empirical complement.  Whether that complement is based on solid ground in the corruption case is the 
theme of this paper. 
research on corruption should be based on direct and first-hand 
observations of corrupt transactions made by unbiased observers 
who are familiar with the rules and routines in the sector under 
scrutiny. More aggregate numbers should then be constructed on 
the basis of such observations. This cannot happen because only a 
few such acts may become observable, and researchers will not be 
the ones to observe them. With respect to private consumption, 
researchers may initiate budget studies and the results there 
checked against statistics collected from stores and enterprises. The 
incentives to lie about the items are normally modest.4   
(2) The observations may not be assumed   independent of the process 
of their revelation. That is, individual i’s beliefs about the extent of 
corruption cannot be assumed independent of individual or agency 
j’s report. Here again, the situation is quite different of, for 
example, the weak or nonexistent feedbacks from published data on 
private consumption, and the individual i’s or j’s reports on their 
consumption, which makes it more plausible that the statistical 
reports about consumption stay pretty close to the real process. 
(3) The situations where corruption may occur are much more 
heterogeneous across agents than private consumption and 
consistent aggregation procedures more difficult to find. Each 
agent’s consumption is made in a similar situation with similar 
forms of motivation constrained by some form of budget. One 
agent’s consumption means the same as the next one. That implies 
(4)   that it is possible  to construct meaningful, empirically based 
aggregates of private consumption based on  micro items.  While 
one may discuss in a precise way, for example, whether Paasche or 
Laspeyre price indexes may be the most appropriate one for 
aggregating  the different items in a consumption bundles to trace 
increase in aggregate private consumption, no parallels exist for 
adding up the size of aggregate corruption, and its possible 
                                                 
4 Some items such as alcohol consumption may be sensitive. In poor surroundings people may try to 
hide all kind of luxury consumption not only against neighbours but also against all government 
authorities including its statistical agencies. 
difference across space and time. The reasonable  aim of the 
aggregate will not be so obvious, but at the same time decisive. For 
example, is aggregate corruption  larger in a country where one 
public procurement decision  of 10 billion has been made for 100 
million in bribes at a high level compared to a country where 10 
000 police official decisions have been influenced by bribes, each 
of 50? A myriad of aggregation problems of similar kinds will 
present themselves if serious aggregation of micro-transactions 
were attempted. 
(5) The aggregation of sub-indexes on which the perception indexes 
are based, accordingly, are themselves either direct reflection of 
more or less diffuse aggregates or aggregated in conceptually 
arbitrary ways for the sub-indexes that are based on some set of 
(mostly diffuse)  micro-transactions.5   
(6) With respect to private consumption, each agent’s income is likely 
to have a similar impact. It then makes good sense, given 
appropriate methods of aggregation, to consider aggregate 
consumption as a meaningful function of aggregate income. It is 
difficult to imagine similar functions for aggregate corruption, even 
it were composed of meaningful micro-items, given the 
heterogeneity of the situations of  corruptible agents, with the 
partial exception of signals sent from the top of a national 
bureaucracy.6  Since it is highly unclear what kind of empirical 
reality the corruption indexes reflect, it is also difficult to tell the 
meaning of the functions they may be embedded into, either as 
explanatory or explained variables.  
 
This raises serious a serious problem for a large share of corruption research, I 
believe.   The last decade or so, the number of empirical studies of corruption has 
increased in about the same rate as theoretical models, taking a definite, quantitative 
and econometric direction. They have become part of and sustained the corruption 
                                                 
5 I will return to the matter of aggregation in somewhat greater detail later. 
6At this stage it would not help us much since there, as far as I know, is no empirical research available  
that describe how such signals are transmitted throughout bureaucracy. 
policy cascade. However, to repeat my point, since most of this research has applied 
as explanatory or explained variables precisely these indexes of corruption, it remains 
quite unclear what these regressions really mean due to the lack of clarity of the 
corruption variable. Is it mainly what Frisch (1970) once  called ‘playometrics’ 7or 
serious research? 
 
 Whatever will be the final verdict of empirical  corruption  (and much of the other 
governance) research,  we should  note at least some forms of progress. While the first 
corruption indexes were quite simple and their aggregation procedures not so well 
grounded from a statistical point of view, significant progress has been made in some 
of the important, technical aspects of their construction.8 The questionnaires that in 
principle should reflect observations better than expert opinions constitute now a 
larger share of the sub-indexes on which the major indexes are built than before.9 
Furthermore, the econometric studies have contributed in making corruption a vivid 
policy issue, producing many interesting and suggestive results and connecting 
corruption to other important economic and political phenomena. Nevertheless, the 
empirical foundation of corruption research is in many respects still quite weak and 
hazy despite statistical refinements, a situation which demands exceptional care when 
evaluating the many econometric results reached in the literature. 
 
 Empirical research into corruption  is characterised by the paradox of  a paucity of 
few direct observational data and  the multitude of  regression studies mostly based on 
                                                 
7 He wrote: "I have insisted that econometrics must have relevance to concrete realities—otherwise it 
degenerates into something which is not worthy of the name econometrics, but ought rather to be called 
playometrics." 
8 The most informative, technical discussion  is still Kaufmann et al  (1999a) which explains the World 
Bank’s governance indexes. Kaufmann et al (2003: 32-39) makes a direct comparison with             
Transparency International’s main corruption index. The technical principles which that one is based 
on at present is explained in recent, yearly ‘framework’ documents,  for example in Lambsdorff (2003). 
An interesting, somewhat broader, but somewhat looser discussion of these indexes more along the 
lines we follow here, is Johnston (2000). The econometric reasoning behind the CPI index has also 
now been more clearly formulated (Lambdorff, 2003). 
9 Reading  Kaufmann et al (2005)  description of the sub-indexes used, about a half is either based on 
questionnaires that raise fairly concrete questions to samples of businessmen or private households, or  
with lending experts with fairly concrete tasks where we may assume  that they are in positions to 
observe or discover  corrupt transactions. Answers to direct questions about retail corruption such as  
whether one has been asked for a bribe by a policeman or teacher the last year,  probably reflect real 
situations quite closely.  This form of corruption probably correlate with corruption at the higher levels,  
and may serve as an indicator of it, but here we are on more slippery ground. A systematic, critical 
exploration of the input to the CPI and WBI indexes according to their declared distance to corruption 
observables should  be made. 
perception indexes  or other  forms of indirect measurements  needing a large of 
disputable assumptions for making the claim that we really are dealing with 
corruption. Let us now speculate a little bit more about why this is so.  
 
  4. The difficulty of direct observation. Definitions 
For our purposes here the exact definition of corruption is of no great consequence, 
but let me put forward the following one: 
An act is corrupt  if a member of an organization uses his position; his  rights to make 
decisions, his access to information, or some other of the resources of the organization, 
to the advantage of a third party and thereby receives money or other economically 
valuable goods or services in ways that  either are illegal or against the organization's 
own aims or rules. An act represents embezzlement if a member of an organization 
uses his rights to make decisions, his access to information or some of the other 
resources of the organization to his own economic advantage, eventually to the 
advantage of some other members of the organization, in ways that are either illegal or 
against the organization's own aims or rules. (Andvig, 1995) 
 
Note here first that a corrupt transaction involves some form of rule-breaking 
behavior. That again implies that it is not possible to look at any set of transactions 
directly and decide whether it is corrupt or not. It has to be related to a set of rules. 
When the rules change, the set of  possible corrupt transactions also changes. This 
creates obvious problems both for observation and for comparison. Second, when a 
corrupt transaction is illegal, but not against an employer’s interests both the 
performer of the transaction and her employer will want to keep it secret. Since she is 
presumably acting in the outsider’s interests, he also wants to keep the transaction 
secret. Eventual third parties who may be harmed by it, are not likely to know about 
the corruptness of the transaction. The complexity of proving it as such  reduces the 
risk of external discovery, making  the public  monitoring agencies  likely to discover  
only a small fraction and to bring an even smaller fraction to court.10   
 
One should expect that the situation where the insider is doing both something illegal 
and something against her employer’s interest would make for a higher rate of 
discovery. However even in this case we would expect public secrecy.  
Seen from the point of view of private enterprises the process of revealing any 
information about corruption has some of the n-person prisoner dilemma 
                                                 
10 When I was allowed access to an economic crime unit  investigating  corruption in the Norwegian oil 
industry  reported in Andvig (1995) I discovered that it would not even consider bringing in more than 
5 – 10% of the likely cases to court.  
characteristics as corruption itself: Since corruption is a type of transaction that will 
be commonly suspected, and where the public is likely to believe in strong 
organizational spillovers, if you admit that a corrupt transaction has taken place in 
your organization while no one else admits corrupt incidences, your organization will 
appear to be exceptionally corrupt, harming its reputation and its stock values. The 
costs involved by the public getting to know an economic crime are much higher than 
the immediate costs, empirical research suggests.11 
We illustrate some of  information channels  in the case where a private enterprise is  
involved in a corrupt transaction: 
 
                   Figure 1 Stylized corruption information flows 
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11 Karpoff and Lott  (1995) estimate that the public revelation of an economic crime causes on average  
something between  one and five per cent loss in stock values depending on the nature of the crime, on 
average for  the companies of which they had data, roughly fifteen times the value of the direct losses. 
The broken arrows indicate whistleblow information, that is, information revealed 
against the management’s knowledge and interests. The unbroken arrows are 
information that follows line authority. Internal security embraces both auditing and 
internal security police. Most of the whistleblow information is stored in the different 
monitoring organizations without the public’s knowledge for reasons (to be) outlined. 
In the  diagram the monitoring organizations are not able to collect any information 
on their own, but rely wholly on informant. This is, of course, extreme, but both the 
logic of the situation and anecdotal information indicate that only a small fraction of  
information stored by the external monitors have originated by their own activities. 
  
 
If everyone openly told about their organization’s experiences each story would cause 
less harm, at the same time as everyone would gain by the more precise knowledge 
accumulated. But even in this open situation it will normally be more profitable not to 
tell, since you then could harvest the increased knowledge at the same time as you 
still would have a reputation to protect. Hence, we must expect the low information 
equilibrium to be a stable one. However, shocks may occur where suddenly the agents 
may be more willing to reveal their knowledge, since it will cost less to tell if others 
are telling. Hence, we may observe situations where large shifts in the rate of public 
revelation of frequencies may occur with small changes in the underlying real 
incidence of corrupt transactions. While the public in general is aware of this 
situation, more frequent revelations will probably also make the public perceive the 
real incidence as increasing, although the evidence here is somewhat mixed. 
 
We may illustrate some of the possibilities here with two simple games, both making 
secrecy the dominant strategy. They deal with the unbroken arrows, and we will not 
try to explore whistleblowers’ behavior here. Let us consider a situation where two 
organizations, EXXON and BP, have discovered that one of their employees have 
been bribed in a bidding process.12 Unaware by the other, the same information 
broker has been involved in both bribe transactions. The broker knows the business 
and will continue if unpunished.  
 
                                                 
12 When they are in supply situations and are active bribers themselves the incentives for keeping 
secrecy would be even stronger. In that case no unbroken arrow will go from the management to the 
police. 
  
 
                  Table 1.  EXXON – BP ‘s Prisoner Dilemma game 
                        
As is conventional, the first number in each pair represents the utility of the row 
player (BP) and the second the utility of the column player (EXXON). In this first, 
prisoners’ dilemma, game it will be of the advantage of both firms to go public, 
compared to the situation where no one does (that is to go to the police, and/or share 
the information with the security service of the other organization). The gain by the 
increased probability of catching the information broker by sharing the information is 
not sufficiently large to compensate for the negative publicity, however, so each 
company wants the other to go to the public and keep its own corruption secret. If 
their information emitting stays decentralized, both will choose to keep their 
corruption cases secret.  However, if the authorities somehow might force such 
cooperation, both companies will gain, and the information will reach the public (or at 
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least the relevant public officials).13  In the second situation - being somewhat 
imprecise - corruption information is even less likely to reach the public. Here the 
best situation for both companies is when they both keep their corruption cases secret. 
Negative reputation spillovers to the industry in general may be so strong that it does 
not compensate for the value of the potential information broker catch.14  
 
Table  2.  EXXON – BP’s   Industry reputation- game 
                        
                            
 
                                                 
13 In the early 1990s  four leading oil companies tried to institutionalise such cooperation in the early 
1990s (see Andvig, 1995), but that cooperation broke down. The degree of secrecy that private 
companies prefer and are allowed to possess is surprising and probably  often not to their own 
advantage. 
14 It is, of course, possible that the enterprises may be more willing to emit information than outlined in 
these games. An assurance or stag hunt game is one possibility: Each want to tell if the other does, but 
if  he doesn’t, the other would not do so either.  The preceding analysis is inspired by a meeting held by  
the Norwegian Association of Industries in December 2000 where every manager expressed a deep 
concern about the grave danger of corruption in general at the same time as each  company told that 
they had hardly experienced corruption themselves. Furthermore each and every one had created 
safeguards that made it highly unlikely to happen. The obvious question to ask how could then 
corruption be a serious issue? 
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Hence, on the basis of reasonable analyses of the generation of corruption data, we 
would expect that concrete (higher-level) corruption stories will be scarce 
everywhere, but in countries with few revelations the rate of revelations to actual 
incidence will be even lower. The perceived rate is likely to follow the revealed rate, 
and hence, we will expect the perceived differences between high and low corruption 
rate countries to exaggerate the difference in actual rates, but we cannot be sure since 
we have no way to know the actual rates. It is even possible that the incentives of 
staying clean may become stronger when the number of revealed cases increases, 
creating a tendency to underreport even more strongly. 
 
In any case, the forms of social interaction connecting actual to revealed  cases are 
likely to be so complex and many-sided that we may not expect the number of  
revealed cases to be a simple function of actual cases. At the very least we need to 
know more about whistleblowing behavior. Neither should we expect the perceived 
levels of corruption  to be any simple function of the number of revealed and even 
less of the number of actual cases. 
 
Before I go into the policy consequences  of  dealing with a research subject where 
truthful information is so scarce and the incentives for deliberate deception are so 
strong, let us see some of the ways this scarcity has  been handled in research.     
 
5. Ways to handle the scarcity of truthful information – a brief overview 
 
             5.1 Direct information and information through front-line units 
Social scientists have rarely been in a position where they have been able to observe 
corrupt transactions first hand and in a systematic way. The exception is, of course, 
retail corruption where we have a number of surveys.  Nevertheless, we have a few 
case studies of corruption such as Wade’s (1982) study of corruption in a large 
irrigation organization in South India. It  displays some of the general insights to be 
gained from a case study. He is able to show how positions were bought and sold in a 
large irrigation organization, and how the income from the sales were collected and 
partly transferred up and fed party organizations. One of the reasons why Wade was 
able to get such direct access to this information was that he had gone through the 
same education – civil engineering  - as his informants.  
  In countries with honest judiciaries, the most reliable information about corruption is 
found in court cases. Courts are spending considerable resources on establishing 
which transaction has in fact taken place, and to judge whether they have actually 
been corrupt. Moreover, the courts have rights to receive relevant information and 
means of punishment if not given, that no social scientist possess. Furthermore they 
often have disposable larger apparatuses for collecting information than most 
researchers. Court cases may then clarify important mechanisms through which 
corrupt transactions actually are made.  However, the threat of punishment may also 
keep some information buried that could otherwise be freely given. 
 
For assessments of frequency and extensiveness, a major problem with court cases is 
that they are so few, compared to the underlying number of corrupt acts. Moreover,  
their number are likely to be strongly  influenced by the relevant judicial and police 
capacities. While always few compared to the actual occurrence, some kind of corrupt 
transaction may be more easily revealed, or the courts may have unequal incentives 
for bringing the different kinds of corrupt transactions to court. The extreme case here 
is when a power shift has occurred and the new rulers want to bring the old ones  
(often rightfully) to court without doing the same for the new rulers when they are 
acting corruptly.  They can neither be used as indicator of sector occurrences nor of 
general corruption frequency. For similar reasons court data are difficult to use for 
cross-country comparisons. They are likely to tell more about political priorities or the 
efficiency of judiciaries and police than about the underlying problem of corruption. 
 
Such data on corruption have nevertheless been collected on an international basis and 
some efforts have been made to make them comparable across countries, for instance 
by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division of the United Nations Office 
in Vienna (United Nations 1999). However, the fact that Singapore and Hong Kong 
have exceptionally high conviction rates confirms the suspicion that data from courts 
cases on corruption, when aggregated, are telling more about judiciary efficiency than 
about corruption frequencies.15 They do, nevertheless, bring interesting and often very 
detailed descriptions of the institutional and motivational mechanisms involved.16 
 
In addition to the court cases, the police and other investigative units, mainly private 
investigation and auditing units of larger firms, are collecting considerable 
information about instances of corrupt transactions, also when the information may 
not be precise enough to win court cases or to fire employees. The quality of this 
unused information is highly variable, ranging from cases almost ready to be brought 
to court, to mere rumors.17 In some cases this information may be sufficiently 
extensive to construct risk patterns for entire sectors, but it will often be biased in the 
sense that active, strongly motivated police units will tend to exaggerate the number 
and danger of the crooks they are hunting. 
 
Investigative journalists are also in several ways in a better position to collect data 
than social scientists. The higher public exposure of journalists gives them a larger 
supply of informants. They will often have to handle the data carefully, since good 
stories demand the naming of actors with the obvious possibility of harming innocent 
individuals. The risk of being sued necessitates caution. Like the police, journalists 
possess much surplus information that they cannot use. This means that stories from 
the media may become important sources of information also for social science 
research on corruption when it comes to establishing facts, including the discovery of 
                                                 
15 This is a general problem with most criminal statistics. Goel and Nelson (1998) used cross-state (in 
the U.S.) co-variations in conviction rates of public officials for office abuse, and real per capita public 
spending as background variables to argue that higher levels of public spending will give rise to higher 
incidences of corruption. However, as argued by Lambsdorff (1999a), the explanation may rather be 
that higher conviction rates are caused by more resources spent on investigation on corruption  when 
public expenditures increase in general than by the increased prospects for  abusing of public money 
that may follow from larger budgets. Glaeser and Falk  (2004) make systematic use of  the regional 
distribution of  federal corruption conviction rates over a long period in the US history to explore 
whether education or  income growth may have impact. 
16 The bribing mechanism in the bidding process in the North sea oil industry was laid bare in a single 
court case. See Andvig (1995) 
17 Andvig (1995) employs information of this kind in a study of corruption in the Norwegian and 
British oil industry, and van Deuyne (1996) has used systematic police information in a mapping of 
Dutch organised crime industry, its bribing included.  
new methods of  implementing corrupt transactions.18 Against all this, their 
commercial interests may skew their stories. 
 
The media are also important subjects of research on corruption, mainly for political 
scientists. Some forms of corruption may be considered a regular source of political 
scandals, and the political effects may often be quite similar to the publication of 
private misbehavior of politicians or their families. The media are important not only 
in bringing forward facts about corruption, but also in forming public and scientific 
perceptions of it. Moreover, the media are to a large extent setting the stage for 
determining the likely political consequences of revealed corruption scandals. 
 
Like court decisions, media sources have their evident biases when comparing corrupt 
transactions across countries and across time. Firstly, the media will tend to give 
priority to the more spectacular stories, paying less attention to the less dramatic but 
more common practices of corruption. Second, and more important, the number of 
stories on corruption reaching the public are likely to be determined not only by how 
many stories that are taking place, but also  by the degree of press freedom, the 
market for corruption stories, the journalistic professionalism and resources available, 
and various kinds of journalistic bandwagon effects. Very aggressive investigative 
journalism of a free press may paradoxically cause the authorities to take precautions,  
making the conditions for whistleblowers more difficult  and thereby reduce the 
number of published cases. 
 
 Media stories are likely to have exceptionally strong effects on the so far most used 
instrument for indirect information, the perception indexes.19  Sometimes it may be 
practically impossible to determine whether a perception of increasing corruption 
                                                 
18 One of the leading researchers in the corruption field, Alan Doig, started out from investigative 
journalism. He has established one of the few international research centres on corruption at Liverpool 
Business School. An influential monograph, relying to a large degree on facts collected by 
investigative journalists, is Doig (1984). In their large study of corruption in American the Goldin and 
Glaeser  research group makes also extensive and systematic use of newspaper data  
19 Cábelcova (2001) reports that  in a set of respondents in Ukraine from 1998,  49% answered that they 
had used the press as a source of information for their assessment of corruption, 66% the TV and 28% 
the radio. Only 25% used personal experience. Stoyanov (at IV Global Forum, 2005) presented data 
that showed extensive fluctuations in the number of newspaper stories about corruption in Bulgaria 
since 2000 at the same time as  the perceived level of corruption appears constant, interpreting the 
result to show that perceived corruption was uninfluenced by the media, an expression of a moral 
constant.  Bringing in lags makes this result less striking, however. 
levels worldwide is based on facts or not, because the main sources used are likely to 
be so strongly influenced by shifts in media attention and public opinion. As far as we 
know, unlike the case of criminal convictions for corruption, no authoritative 
international counting of media stories has been made so far, but a few attempts at the 
national level have been performed.20 
 
It is clear that the actual occurrences of discovered and provable corrupt acts passing  
courts, media and the few instances of participatory research are too few in most 
countries to constitute a representative sample of the underlying corrupt transactions. 
To create patterns and analyses, researchers have to bring in information that is 
relatively unreliable, and then try to process it and make explicit the large and hardly 
determinable margins of error in the field. Or, alternatively, researchers can decide to 
let the uncertain and imprecise information about patterns pass, and consider it as not 
amenable to serious research. 
 
Until the middle of the 1970s, the last strategy has been the dominant one. Gunnar 
Myrdal was an important exception. He urged (Myrdal, 1968: 940-42)  that: “ the 
folklore of corruption embodies important social facts worth intensive research in 
their own right. …The beliefs  about corruption … are easily observed and analysed,  
and this folklore has a crucial bearing on .. conduct.  The data [on folklore], and the 
process of collecting them, should give clues for the further investigation of the facts 
of actual corruption.”  We had to wait until the mid-1990s  before this research 
program was taken seriously, however. It was then given a quantitative and 
comparative twist, probably not imagined by Myrdal. That again had many 
advantages, but one serious drawback. The focus on quantities made it easier to forget  
that  the basic data were still folklore and  to rephrase folklore as facts. The outcome 
was that a large number of econometric studies have been published since then, the 
mid 1990s, based upon several indexes of aggregate country perceived  levels of 
                                                 
20 For a rather rough report on Canadian data which reports media coverage on different types of 
economic crime, including corruption see Beare and Ronderos (2001). While the number of cases 
reported on corruption is lower than most other types of economic crime, more than 100 cases are 
reported each year indicating that quantitative exploration of newspaper reports may prove a fruitful 
line of empirical inquiry.  As far as I know few systematic  explorations of the  vulnerability  of the 
perception indexes to public scandals have been undertaken. In their large project on the history of U.S 
corruption Glaeser,  Goldin et al (2005) make extensive use of media data.   
corruption.21 The first and probably most influential one was Mauro (1995), who 
brought corruption into the renewed field of economic growth studies among 
economists. It was an econometric study of the effects of country corruption level on 
the growth rate, and the results indicated that there was indeed a significant negative 
impact. The study was based on data on general country corruption levels. What kind 
of data had Mauro been able to find? 
 
   5.2 Corruption folklore and  perception indexes 
Mauro (1995) used mainly data from a commercial organization, Business 
International (BI), which in 1980 made an extensive survey of a large number of 
commercial and political risk factors, including corruption, for 52 countries, among 
these several developing countries. Business International had an international 
network of correspondents (journalists, country specialists, and international business 
people) who were asked about whether and to what extent business transactions in the 
country in question involved corruption or questionable payments.. 
 
In fact, Business International was not the only organization that tried to monitor 
where international businesses have to expect the most extensive or frequent bribe 
demands. Quite a number of both profit and non-profit organizations constructed 
similar indexes. Today Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index” 
(CPI) is still the best known and the one most often used both in research and in the 
public debate. Another important index is the World Bank Institute’s “control of  
corruption” variable ( WBI-index).22 Unlike most of the commercial indexes they are 
handed out free of charge. 
 
As we have noted the basic ideas of  both  indexes  are quite similar, and they are 
even composed of many of the same sub-indexes and produce very similar judgments. 
Their correlation is above 0.9 (Kaufmann et al 2003).  Both are constructed as a 
weighted average of different indexes from several different organizations. The 
majority of these indexes are based on fairly vague and general questions about the 
                                                 
21 Most researchers, of course, admit when formulating their regression set-up that their corruption 
variable is to a large extent based on perceptions, but then start to interpret the results as if it is actual 
corruption that was embedded in the regression equations. Cábelcova (2001)again is an exception 
22 The most detailed  explanation of the statistical method behind the WBI- index is in Kaufmann et al 
(1999), an updated version is Kaufmann et al (2005).  The most recent description of CPI is  
Lambsdorff (2004). 
level or frequency of corruption perceived either by experts or business managers. 
Some of the sub-indexes are based upon expert opinions with inbuilt checks to ensure 
cross-country consistency. Other are mainly based on questionnaires sent to middle- 
and high-level management of either international or local firms with only vague and 
general questions about corruption. A few ask about their perception of more detailed 
situations.23 Equally few ask the respondents directly about their own experience of 
corruption. Due to its method of aggregation the WBI-index has been able to include 
some of the  recent regional surveys  (such as the Latino and Afro- barometers) that  
ask respondents about their direct experience. But still they both remain largely  a 
“poll of polls”, reflecting the impressions of business people and risk analysts who 
have been surveyed in a variety of ways. 
 
The reason why they  both aggregate the different sub-indexes, is to increase the 
statistical precision, to reduce the statistical noise of the  corruption indicator. A 
composite index would  be the statistically most robust means of measuring 
perceptions of corruption.  This may be questioned in different ways. For one thing, 
each of the other surveys uses different sampling frames and varying methodologies. 
The definition of the corruption concept also varies between the surveys. Thus, we 
may question whether the surveys cover the same phenomenon. Are the different 
questions asked by the various organizations, really the same?  In terms of 
methodology , the most striking  difference is that WBI started out with an explicit 
model while the CPI in the beginning was constructed by some kind of  trial and error 
procedure, and then not completely transparent. Partly by being challenged  by the 
Kaufmann group this has changed. 
 
 Another  interesting difference between the CPI and WBI approach – if I have 
understood the procedures correctly -  is that while CPI  assumes that  each sub-index 
is equally precise, but that their common precision may vary across country,  WBI 
allows the sub-indexes degree of precision to vary, but assume that each hit every 
country with the same degree of precision. This makes it easier to link sub-indexes 
                                                 
23 Several of the World Bank sub-indexes such as the BEEPS survey ask the management respondents 
about how common corruption is in your branch of activity and interpret that as a hidden statement of 
what it does itself. That is, the interpretation assumes that one has caught corruption observed. This is 
clearly not a valid interpretation. Although closer to something observable, a questionnaire of this kind 
is still confined to a study of  Myrdal’s folklore of corruption world.    
with few country observations to the aggregate. Another advantage of WBI, 
Kaufmann et al (1999) argue, is that it makes the weights endogenous so that the sub-
indexes that inter-correlate more strongly with the others, are ascribed a higher 
weight. But if this really is to be an advantage, a crucial assumption of the 
aggregation procedure should hold: The error term of each index observation should 
be stochastically independent of the others.24 We have already seen that there are 
theoretical reasons why the agents directly observing corrupt transactions will be 
influenced by their social interaction when emitting public corruption signals.  
 
How reasonable is it that the strong correlation between the sub-indexes is due to 
correlation of errors, and not to independent observations of the same government 
characteristics?  Several of the sub-indicators with the strongest inter-correlation are 
based on respondents´ answers to very general and vague questions about their 
perceptions of corruption levels in country A, B or C. The questions are not leading 
the respondents to focus on their own experience, if they have any. At least in 
countries where the citizens have no daily, individual experience of corruption, the 
assessments have to be based on the process through which information about 
corruption reach the public domain. How is that process? 
 
As far as I know, little precise, empirically based knowledge is here available. As a 
first approximation, however, I will expect strong correlation and spillover effects: 
The experts read the same reports and gauge other experts´ statements. Since the 
assessments are not likely to be based on clear individual experience, when expert X 
claims corruption in A is very high, expert Z has no clear evidence to the contrary, so 
when knowing X´s statement it may be optimal to make an assessment close to his. 
Informational cascades may, as we have argued, easily develop in this context.25 The 
fact that the TI index in particular is widely published, reinforces the argument. The 
case of expatriate businessmen is somewhat different, but they are not likely to base 
their assessments to any large extent on their own, independent experience either. 
Much will be based upon other businessmen’s communication. The degree to which 
                                                 
24 While Kaufmann et al (1999) admitted from the start at the assumption of stochastic independence  
might be unrealistic, they did not consider the problem as crucial, because it would only reinforce their 
polemics against the CPI’ use of  the index in performing country ranks.  With dependence the  
variance of the index would increase  and  make such rankings even more doubtful. 
25 Many of the conditions for of such cascades to develop are fulfilled in this case (see, for example, 
Bikhchandani, et al., 1992).  
that will contain private information, will at best depend on how much private 
communication other expatriates reveal.  
This problem is indeed quite critical for the aggregation procedure.  For example, one 
of the arguments for aggregating the sub-indexes is that they are strongly inter-
correlated and therefore must show the same phenomenon as indicated in the 
following table (BI; ICRG and Gallup are the subindexes): 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between different perceived corruption ratings 
 
 CPI 1996 CPI 1997 CPI 1998 BI (early 
1980s) 
ICRG (for 
the 1980s) 
Gallup 
International 
1997 
CPI 1996 1.000 0.9689 0.9663 0.8739 0.8844 0.7719 
CPI 1997  1.000 0.9880 0.8517 0.8828 0.8403 
CPI 1998   1.000 0.8044 0.8785 0.8424 
BI (early 1980s)    1.000 0.8512 0.6471 
ICRG (for 1980s)     1.000 0.7244 
 
Sources: Transparency International and Treisman (2000) 
 
 
 But what if the inter-correlation  may be ascribed  social interaction between experts 
and between businessmen and/or their cross-group interaction?   
The fundamental prior of  both the CPI and WBI indexes is that all sub-indexes 
approximates the same underlying corruption variable with an error. By aggregating, 
this error is reduced. This interpretation demands a leap of faith. A more reasonable 
prior would be, I believe,  to  consider each as a mixture of  at least three components, 
one indicating a measure of social interaction within the international community, the 
second component  a measure of corruption, and a third a proxy for social interaction 
within the single country.  
 
5.3 Closer to the world of observation, but still folklore: Detailed questionnaires 
The work under the auspices of the World Bank since 1996 to develop more detailed 
and focused information about different aspects corruption by means of  
questionnaires addressed to businessmen and officials, is a most interesting and 
important expansions of statistical information. So far, the World Bank has developed 
several, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
also become involved. In these, enterprises are asked about how large a share of their 
expenditures is paid out in bribes, whether they try to bribe lawmakers to give 
advantageous laws, whether they pay out bribes to win single contracts, and so on. 
Furthermore, detailed questions about whether the bribed officials fulfill their 
promises, whether the outcome is predictable, etc. are included.26 One such 
questionnaire was made for the 1997 World Development Report, and a considerably 
improved version is the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS). An interesting  set of results for the transition countries are reported 
(Hellman et al 2000a). The results, however, appear promising in the sense that new 
opportunities for gaining empirical insight into corruption are opening up. For 
example, it appears likely that the firm-level effects on bribes paid for gaining public 
procurement contracts become quite different when lawmakers are for sale compared 
to situations when they are not.27  
 
In 2002 the World Bank /EBRD made a new BEEPS questionnaire with many of the 
1999 questions, and adding some new ones, inter alias, specifying new influence 
variables (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2003). Compared with the aggregate corruption 
indexes the BEEPS questionnaires both present firm-level data, and  are able to go 
beyond the ordinal number characteristics of the aggregate corruption perception 
indexes by asking questions around the size of bribes. Moreover, the set of questions 
forces the respondents to focus on more concrete corrupt situations and, hence, they 
are less likely to only  respond on the basis of loose impressions. The self- confident 
(and maybe deserved)  feeling of being on  an exceptionally  promising track of 
empirical research into an area  that has proved difficult to penetrate, is reflected in 
Kaufmann´ s (2003a) strong headline: “The Power of Data: Governance Can be 
                                                 
26 The direct, firm-level data from the World Bank are briefly presented in Wei (2000) and applied in 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999). Most of the data published have so far focused on the so-called transition 
countries. Svensson (2000), however, applies firm-level data from Uganda, based on the Ugandan 
Industrial Enterprise Survey, initiated by the World Bank but implemented by the Ugandan 
Manufactures Association. 
27 A presentation of the recent questionnaire is given in Hellman et al (2000a), and an example of its 
results (the results to a question of the role of political corruption in transition countries) is given in 
Hellman et al. (2000b). These data are very valuable to researchers, who, in general, are unable to 
gather this kind of material individually. Most researchers lack the resources and, more importantly, the 
authority and legitimacy and funds needed to get a questionnaire like this developed and  answered. An 
earlier report based on this methodology, applied at the global level, is Brunetti et al. (1997). 
Measured, Monitored, and Rigorously Analyzed.”  On the basis of that work it is now 
possible to construct reasonably comparable (across countries) measures of different 
forms of corruption, whether corrupt deals are honored, and so on, for a large and 
increasing number of countries, all seen from the enterprises’ point of view. 
Nevertheless,  when compared the pictures that emerge about  the different  countries 
appear quite confusing and often delinked  from what is known about institutiona and 
economic fundamentals of the countries in question. 
 
With a few exception, most the micro-based research into different, decomposed 
aspects of corruption has relied on the more widely collected  business questionnaire 
data, such as the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). Sensibly, in order to 
gain answers from the enterprises about their experience of sensitive corruption, the 
questions had to be “phrased indirectly about the corruption faced by ‘firms in your 
line of business’”  (Hellman et.al., 2000: 20) For example, questions have been raised 
about  how much of the income is paid  in bribes, how often are bribes paid to gain a 
public procurement contract , etc. “in your line of business”. ). While producing 
interesting results closer to observed  reality than vague questions about  how 
extensive corruption is in country A compared to country B,  it is still an answer to a 
question about how the agents perceive their surroundings, not about their own direct 
experience. When Hellman et al in a number of publications claim that their answers 
about the general conditions in the industry is an indirect way to report their own 
experience,  they over-interpret the answers. The respondents are more likely simply 
to answer the question, that is, to report their perceptions of the corruption state in 
their industry.  Despite the focus on concrete situations in the questions , this is still 
not the same as reporting experience.  
  
An indication of how their interpretation may reach counter-intuitive results is the 
World Bank group’s paper on multinational companies’ behavior in transition 
countries  (Hellman et al., 2002) where they find that multinational enterprises from 
low-corruption countries behave as, or even more, corruptly as the locals even in the 
most corrupt countries. That they perceive the state of their industry as even more 
corrupt than the locals is no wonder. Their result is counter-intuitive given the larger 
reputation costs of multinational companies, if caught.  
 
For some countries the information about industry and office perceptions  may be 
compared with the private households’ and public officials’ experience or perceptions 
in so-called diagnostic surveys.28 In another line of research the World Bank has 
focused on the different branches of public government and asked different groups of 
officials about their perception and experience of governance issues including 
corruption.29 For a few Latin American countries  Seligson (2002, 2003 ) has also 
collected a set of corruption data where households are asked about their direct 
experience. However, it still is the fact that reported experience is almost impossible 
to get access to through questionnaires, except for petty corruption in highly corrupt 
countries.  
 
 5.4 The hunt for indirect real-economic indicators 
Recently a number of studies have been made where we may deduce something about 
the  seriousness of corruption on the basis of  data from the real economy: Public 
expenditure tracking (Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson)Expense versus output in 
public projects (Italy by Golden and Picci), relative size of underground economy 
(Andvig for Azerbajan,) and corrupt-like scandals (Andersson for Sweden), number 
of inhability cases (Smith for Oslo, Norway) and so on. [ a useful, brief discussion is 
in Rose-Ackerman 2004] . It will be misleading to assume that relying on 
observables, this research  may come closer to observed corruption and having 
smaller degrees of error than  research working through perceived levels of 
corruption. A number of often drastic assumptions which validity may not be 
empirically scrutinized, are often  needed to make these variables to tell stories about 
corruption..  
 
 5.5 The detour to observations through the laboratory 
Recently several experiments of constructed economic interaction intended to 
simulate real life corruption characteristics have been made in laboratory settings. The 
behavior is observed, recorded and statistically analyzed. The use of laboratory has 
opened up new and in one sense direct observations of corrupt behavior. Moreover, 
by varying the experimental conditions it is possible to establish more direct ties to 
                                                 
28 See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/diagnostics.html 
29 In the case of Bolivia, see Manning et al. (2000). So far, only a few countries are covered. The 
project is closed. 
basic microeconomic theory of corruption. Several interesting studies have been 
made. 
 
For example, in Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) the basic corruption dyad is 
constructed as a trust game where the potential briber, the ‘firm’, has to make an 
initial outlay, a transfer fee, if it wants to bribe the other member of the dyad, ‘the 
official’. The ‘official’ may choose one of two alternatives where the corrupt 
alternative will give the firm a large profit, but the official a small loss. To induce the 
official to choose its more profitable option, the firm may perform an actual transfer 
where the official receive three times as much as the firm sacrifices in that trial of the 
experiment. The official may accept the transfer, but still choose the non-corrupt 
alternative.  Hence, we have a trust game structure. This set-up may then be varied:  A 
large, exogenous, but low probability punishment, simulating conditions in low 
corruption societies, was shown to have surprisingly strong effects in preventing 
corrupt deals. Rotation of officials, that is that the same official was not allowed to 
make many plays with the same firm, had also strong preventive effects (Abbink, 
2000b) while introducing harmful effects on participants outside the dyad had only 
weak effects. Surprisingly weak effects were also the outcome when the experiment 
was explicitly framed as simulating corruption (Abbink and Hennig-Scmidt, 2002).  
 
While the laboratory situation allows a study of the specifics of a type of corrupt 
transaction, this very specificity is one of several reasons why it is necessary to be 
careful when applying the results to real-life situations. For example, when the 
rotation of officials had so strong preventive effect in the Abbink experiment, it is 
probably  explained by the trust-game formulation, that the officials may catch the 
bribe without delivering the corrupt result. That is also the case in many real-life 
situations, but in many other situations it is impossible to receive the transfer and not 
deliver. In such situations rotation may not have strong effects.  
 
More generally, the individuals who participate in the laboratory know they are acting 
in a laboratory, not in real life, so in this sense all corruption experience collected 
there is only an indirect indicator of corrupt transactions in real life.  At the very least, 
what the subjects do in the laboratory is not illegal.  The last fact makes it even more 
difficult to use laboratory evidence than in other forms of economic experience at the 
same time as the difficulty of collecting direct experience makes it potentially more 
useful. We should add that laboratory research simulating criminal economic behavior 
may be more ethically demanding than most other forms of  such research. The 
subjects might loose self-esteem discovering that they have in fact accepted a bribe. 
This ethical dimension has not received sufficient attention in economic laboratory 
research, but is routine in experimental psychology, although here unethical research 
may often be observed (Bok, 1978).  
  
5.6. Mr. Poirot vs. Mr. Marlowe: The approach of action research 
Most social science research apply the method of mr. Poirot : to observe and deduct. 
However, a few attempts to apply  the method of mr. Marlowe have been made: To 
inject noise into the social system studied  and stir it through their own actions in 
order to identify forces invisible when it is in equilibrium. 
  
Partly inspired by an older Scandinavian-based action research approach,30 new 
attempts have been made to combine questionnaires addressed to local leaders and to 
the general public with sets of public meetings where issues of corruption are brought 
up. From a research point of view, the advantage is that publicity may make 
respondents more interested in answering and less afraid of exposing local corruption. 
In addition, public attention and concern may create changes in public policies as well 
as ignite a process of anti-corruption efforts, which may in itself bring forward new 
data about the ‘where, how and why’ of corruption in the country in question. 
 
A clear exposition of the action research approach is found in Langseth et al. (1997). 
Furthermore, an interesting collection of data created by this approach is found in 
Uganda National Integrity Survey 1998. While initiated by the World Bank, like the 
data collection referred to in section 3.3, Transparency International, and several 
multilateral and national aid organizations have embraced the method. 
 
The method has also some obvious weaknesses, however. The statistical validity may 
be questioned when the answers cannot be considered statistically independent as they 
                                                 
30 Originally action research focused on intra-organisational problems of work-organisations. The basic 
idea from a research point of view is that by initiating changes and record the effects researchers may 
gain information otherwise not produced. In addition, researchers may become social activists and 
achieve desirable results through their work. Needless to add, difficult role conflicts may arise.  
become part of a public campaign where emotions are stirred. Valuable data about 
high level (political) corruption can only rarely be brought forward by this action 
research approach, since the answers generated are based on or biased towards rumors 
rather than direct observation. 
 
The method has so far, however, been able to generate data about forms of corruption 
that have high public visibility such as the police and judiciary, the school and health 
systems, and in some cases also local road construction. The method also has some 
potential in exposing more complex forms of corruption if it is brought into its 
original intra-organizational setting and thereby exposing intra-organizational 
problems for public discussion. The major attraction of the method for researchers 
and sponsors is the possibility it offers to kill two birds with one stone: to do research 
on corruption and fight it at the same time.  
 
Summing up this section, researchers have tried many ways to circumvent the basic 
difficulty in empirical corruption research: The scarcity of direct, relevant 
observations.  Despite many serious efforts of which the perception indexes have been 
the most influential, I believe we still are missing that bridge that may lead from the 
observables to the kinds of corrupt behavior we want research and influence.  The 
corruption perception  approach  has until now mainly consisted in a quantification 
and indexation of rather vague and loosely structured conceptions of corruption. 
 
 At one hand this implies, I believe, that all the impressive  results from the growing 
number of econometric work based on these indexes must be considered to be more 
preliminary than normal.31 Here we may hope that the data collection based on 
processes closer to observables that has been initiated by the World Bank ( reported 
                                                 
31 Here I should add that it may also be premature to dismiss their value. Mocan (2004) gets a fairly 
good correspondence between the aggregate perception levels and the actual corruption as measured by 
his aggregation procedures based on the micro-data (on petty corruption from the international Crime 
Victimisation Surveys (ICVS). The relationship disappears, however, when a variable meant to indicate 
the quality of institutions are included.  Abramo (2005) achieves little correspondence, but a number of 
tricky and interesting   results when he tries to relate the observables and the perception variables in the 
latest  (December 2004) TI corruption barometer, but some of the results may be driven  by  the noise 
in the observables  in that barometer (see the appendix,). Cábelkova  (2001) get better and more 
plausible  relationships  for a set of micro-data from Ukraine than the ones that may be dug out from 
the barometer. The systematic study of relationships between perceptions and experiences is clearly 
another key field for further research. As mentioned above, Stoyanov (2005) reaches more pessimistic 
results that imply that perception data are useless for  studies of actual corruption 
  
by Hellman et al  2000a, 2000b) when combined with questionnaires  asking direct 
questions about frequency and size  of petty corruption may give rise to more 
convincing results. Still these move around in the field of data Myrdal  dubbed  - not 
in any derogatory way  - as the folklore of corruption.   
 
Their shaky bridge to real corruption,  makes it difficult and tricky to apply the 
perception indexes for policy purposes, although this is what recently has happened. 
Here it doesn’t really help to claim that perceived corruption may have as strong 
effects as its actual counterpart. If so, the policy instruments that address perceptions 
are likely to be different from the ones addressing the real part. For example, if 
foreign direct investment is more harmed by perceived than real corruption, and the 
present proposal that aid allocation across the set of the poorest countries should be 
guided by their status on a set of perceived governance indexes of which the one on 
corruption is the most important one, the proposal would imply that foreign aid would 
reinforce the inequality  dynamics of the international  private investment process. 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2004) warn against this use of the governance indexes. Their 
argument is strictly technical, however:  Wide confidence levels make them unreliable 
for the task.  
  
 6. The political economy of scarce and unreliable information 
An important mechanism that allowed  the wide shift in the international opinion 
about  the prevalence and importance of corruption that took place in the early 1990s, 
was the lack of  precise and reliable  information. It allowed the internal censure of  
the leading  international and foreign aid agencies to operate,  keeping the issue away 
from public scrutiny for several decades. A few credible witnesses, a couple of policy 
proposals and some seemingly hard data were sufficient to develop a cascade of  
attention. But soon come, soon gone? May the wheel turn back again for the same 
reasons? May the facts brought forward in the corruption field prove hazy and 
unconvincing, the policy proposals not workable with only symbolic effects? Despite 
the plethora of statistical information developed  during its  one and half decade of 
policy attention, corruption is in many ways still a phenomenon characterized  by  
scarce and unreliable information that colors anti-corruption  as a policy field. 
 
Let us first look at so-called ‘grand’ corruption where the amounts bribed, extorted or 
embezzled are significant and the transactors involved are operating from economic 
or political elite positions. The acts are criminal. Several international policy 
proposals such as OECD’s anti-bribery convention addresses this phenomenon. How 
to judge whether countries really are following this (and similar )conventions, and 
how to judge whether the conventions are working and have impact on corruption of 
this kind?  Since we are here dealing with individual, criminal acts, governance  
indicators are of little help. Particular individuals and organizations have to be caught  
for it to have impact on the potential mass of corrupt transactions. 
 
And here the fact that it is difficult to establish reliable facts about  individual, 
criminal corrupt transactions, determine both the monitoring issues, the actual impact 
of the policy proposals as well as the coloring of the public debates around them. For 
example, if only a few enterprises are caught in bribing foreign officials, it may imply  
that these kinds of transactions in fact are rare, or  that the bribing of foreign officials 
are common, but  the authorities make few efforts in catching them, or, or that  they 
may be common but so inherently  difficult to prove that only few cases  may be 
found even if the authorities are making great efforts. It is only in the second case that 
the conventions are likely to be of potential importance for actual corruption, but then 
it is not in any country’s own interest in catching its own enterprises.  If  this kind of 
bribing is known to be common it implies that foreigners will gain much business in 
your country that way.  Why should your police force be eager to pursue your 
citizens? We are back to the prisoners’ dilemma again. In principle it could, of course, 
be solved by some form of international policing, but no such organization is, to my 
knowledge, on the horizon.  And even if we got one, we will return to the dilemma of  
scarce and unreliable information that rules such large areas of  this field 
 
 In any case it is a fact that few cases are brought forward to the courts, but this fact 
cannot be used to identify the rarity of corruption nor identify whether countries are 
following the convention, or not.  Nor can any increase in the number of cases tell 
whether the bribing of foreign officials or the economic police have become more 
serious. Seen from another point of view, the knowledge that elite corruption is 
difficult to prove together with the notion that it is likely to prevalent at least as a 
temptation, implies that if in any particular case an enterprise or an official become 
suspected in public, it makes it almost impossible for them to disprove it and the 
public suspicion may linger on.  
 
Now let us look at the governance indexes. They may give rise to an impression that   
corruption is like any other kind of macro-economic variable amenable to systematic 
steering through a clever use of technocratic policy instruments. Are they sufficiently 
reliable to be used in that way?  So far, the main policy discussion around the 
corruption indexes has focused on their rankings. It is clear that the open ranking of  
countries made by  TI when presenting its  CPI index has had considerable impact on 
the policy discussion of corruption in many countries making the political elites 
among the lower end  of the developing countries to feel (unfairly) exposed.  In 
particular the outcomes of neighboring countries have been eagerly discussed, and 
changes in their mutual ranking have in practice been used as a benchmark to gauge 
whether the situation in a given country has improved or not.  Kaufmann et al (2005), 
however, have refused to present their WBI  index  so that countries are ranked  after 
their corruption value on their index. The reason  given has been that they consider 
the country confidence intervals too wide to make the country ranking statistically 
significant, although these intervals have narrowed down  since their first edition of 
the index after a larger number of sub-indexes have been included.  
 
Nevertheless, it is the WBI index that has been applied when some foreign aid 
institutions have started to allocate parts of their foreign aid across the poorest 
countries after their performance on the WBI index. USAID has led this development 
(USAID, 2005). That is, some of the OECD countries have started a systematic 
monitoring of a larger group of developing countries governance characteristics to a 
large extent based on their performance on the WBI’s  ‘control of corruption’ and 
related governance indexes in order to reward and punish them accordingly with aid.32   
 
While not endorsing this practice, Kaufmann et al (2005)  has developed a study of 
the statistical significance of changes in the governance indicators for each country  
                                                 
32 US foreign aid institutions have begun to do this most systematically for aid for the so called 
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA).  First , a group of  countries with sufficiently low  income is 
determined. The country with median level of corruption in this group is then determined. No country 
with corruption performance worse than the median  is eligible to aid from  MCA. Then the actual 
norm for aid to receive is determined by a rather complex formula based on a number of governance 
indicators in addition to the corruption performance.  
that would be extremely helpful for such monitoring. For a few countries the changes 
have been large enough to be statistically significant to indicate  improvement or 
worsening of their governance characteristics. Significant or not rely, of course, on 
the reasonableness of  the  statistical assumptions applied by Kaufmann et al. . 
 
So far governance indexes are for many purposes  the only instruments available for 
gauging quantitatively the effects of  policies trying to reduce the incidence and 
severity of corruption. Their loose ties to the reality remain a basic weakness.  If a 
successful anti-corruption campaign reduces the actual levels of corruption, brings 
more cases to court or at least into the public, the public –including the experts – are 
likely to perceive higher corruption levels. Isolated scandals may shift  the perception. 
Countries with an aggressive investigative journalism like Kenya may for that reason 
be perceived as more corrupt than Tanzania that traditionally has had a more docile 
press. A natural response to a corruption index-guided aid allocation, might be for the 
Kenyan authorities to pacify the journalists. Sometimes their high perception content 
might yield implausible increases when other economic data are changing, as  during 
financial crises (Argentine and Indonesia) or effective, but non-liberal anti-corruption 
campaigns (Malaysia). In more quiet situations their feedback on themselves may 
make the indexes  immune against changes in the data.  
 
Another peculiarity when applied as part of a monitoring apparatus may be considered 
as an advantage, however: Their weak links to actual performance of country elites, 
their complex composition of separate sub-indexes with basis in widely different 
sources of information make them also difficult to manipulate in order to reach easy 
gains in the monitoring indicators   – a perennial problem of any monitoring scheme. 
Alas, their difficulty in manipulation make them also unfit to tell the monitored agents 
what to do.  Reward or punishment tends to come out from the blue. 
 
Summing up,  despite all useful quantitative information that has been collected – 
particularly at the country level, information that may be acted upon is still scarce and 
unreliable for that purpose.  For some countries with extensive corruption most forms 
of corruption is public knowledge, however, and fairly easy to collect, but here no 
existing public apparatuses work in ways that may action feasible. For the rest, the 
information is partly scarce (court cases, police and journalist information) and partly 
unreliable, compounded  in corruption perception indexes.  
 
 I believe that corruption is a deep and common form of transaction in the present day 
world, but we only rarely possess reliable information about it, at least not at the 
higher levels of authority in  the private and public sector.  Possessing that belief  at 
the individual level, it is easy to suspect certain groups of players to be involved, but 
difficult to prove. It is easy to talk about anti-corruption policy in general, but difficult 
to implement it without nailing specific individuals, but  that  may often be  
impossible in practice due to a lack of evidence (or lack of power). Corruption has 
become a form  crime  believed to be both common and harmful, but difficult to 
detect, and even more difficult to fight. A major reason is the lack of evidence, the 
situation of scarce and unreliable information. It easily creates a feeling of  suspicion 
and apathy. Considerable efforts have been made by researchers to bring forward 
evidence, but it is rarely precise and based on clear evidence, observations..   
 
As far as I may judge, we are still living in a house of sticks. That is not caused by 
laziness, however, but by the lack of bricks. To keep the wolf away we have tried to 
dress up the sticks as bricks. The wisdom of that procedure may now be disputed 
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Appendix. Some remarks and information on perceived vs. reported corruption 
 
The key issue in empirical corruption research is the status of the corruption indexes 
that contain a mixture of perceived and reported corruption. In the paper I have 
suggested several ways to proceed to explore this matter critically. One is to divide 
the leading indicators on the basis of the information given about the informational 
basis of the sub-indicators:  Study the mutual correlation among the clearly perception 
based sub-indexes, the mutual correlation among the mixed perception-observation 
based sub-indexes and finally the mutual correlation among the  clearly observation-
related sub-indexes. Then we may correlate the group indexes against each other. If 
the correlation among the perception-based indexes are very strong, but not so strong  
with  the observation-based indexes, it would be reasonable to interpret this as an 
indication that the perception indexes contain a significant social interaction factors, 
and the value of these sub-indexes in the aggregate should be discounted. If there is 
not any systematics of the suggested  kinds the existing interpretations are more 
defensible. Most of the purely perception-based sub-indexes are, however, not the 
perceptions engaged in the corrupt transactions, but the perception of outsiders. The 
mixed indexes  contain mostly perceptions of potential insiders. 
 
Ideally, perceptions of the agents involved  should be related  to the experience of the 
same agents. This is what Cabelcova (2001) has done for Ukraine, but she did not do 
it in any comparative perspective. This is what Abramo (2005) does using data from 
the TI’s barometer published December 2004. this  is a survey based on a large 
number of individual household respondents who in addition to being asked about a 
number of perceptions also were asked about their experience with petty corruption 
the last year.  Abramo finds none or very strange relationships between the different 
forms of perceptions and expectations and experience. Here I  will not try to analyse 
his results, only comparing the TI barometer experience  data with the existing 
experience survey the International Crime Victimization Surveys from the mid 1990s 
and the leading perception-composed indexes the WBI and CPI. The countries chosen 
are the ones that are contained in both the TI Barometer and the ICVS, since they are 
the constraining ones now.  
 
I will not analyse the issues  here, just put down the table that suggests that the TI 
barometer from 2004 corresponds less well with the other indexes. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix table 1. Perceived and reported corruption indexes 
 
   
Country TIB-04 ICVS-95-6 CPI-04 WBI r(TIB) r(ICVS) r(CPI) r(WBI) 
Albania 30 % 13 %        2.5 -0.72 2 10 4 4 
Argentina 6 % 29 %        2.5 -0.44 15 2 4 7 
Austria 1 %        0.7%        8.4 2.10 27 21 25 28 
Bolivia 29 % 26 %        2.2 -0.78 3 3 3 3 
Brazil 11 % 18 %        3.9 -0.15 13 7 12 10 
Bulgaria 6 % 19 %        4.1 -0.04 15 5 14 11 
Canada 1 %               0.4%        8.5 1.99 27 24 26 25 
CostaRica 14 % 10 %        4.9 0.78 11 14 18 18 
Croatia 9 % 16 %        3.5 0.08 14 8 10 12 
Czech R. 21 % 8 %        4.2 0.30 6 15 15 15 
Denmark 2 %         0.3%        9.5 2.38 21 25 30 30 
Estonia 6 % 4 %        6.0 0.82 15 18 19 19 
Finland 3 %         0.1%        9.7 2.53 19 30 31 31 
France  2 %         0.7%        7.1 1.44 21 21 22 22 
India 16 % 21 %        2.8 -0.31 10 4 7 8 
Indonesia 13 % 31 %        2.0 -0.90 12 1 1 1 
Japan 1 %        0.0%        6.9 1.19 27 31 21 20 
Latvia 18 % 14 %        4.0 0.23 9 9 13 14 
Lithuania 32 % 11 %        4.6 0.36 1 12 16 16 
Netherlands 2 %         0.5%         8.7 2.08 21 23 28 27 
Philippines 21 % 4 %         2.6 -0.55 6 18 6 6 
Poland  5 % 5 %         3.5 0.16 18 17 10 13 
Portugal 2 % 1 %         6.3 1.23 21 20 20 21 
Romania 25 % 11 %       2.9 -0.25 4 12 9 9 
Russia 21 % 19 %       2.8 -0.72 6 5 7 4 
S. Africa 3 % 8 %       4.6 0.48 19 15 16 17 
Spain 2 %        0.3%       7.1 1.45 21 25 22 23 
Switzerl. 2 %        0.2%       9.1 2.17 21 29 29 29 
UK 1 %        0.3%       8.6 2.06 27 25 26 26 
Ukraine 25 % 13 %       2.1 -0.89 4 10 2 2 
USA 0 %        0.3%       7.5 1.83 31 25 24 24 
         
Explanation of the table: TIB –04 is the share of the respondents in the TI  2004 
barometer survey who reported they had experienced to have paid a bribe last year. 
ICVS is the same reported experience collected  in the International Crime 
Victimisation Surveys from 1995- 1996. CPI 04 is  the results from TI’s  Corruption 
Perception index from 2004, and WBI is the same for the WBI’s ‘control of 
corruption’ indicator. r (   ) is the country ranking results for the  relevant indicator 
ranked so that the most corrupt country in the table  is ranked as 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
